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We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard 
models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government 
assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance 
might be some type of government-sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type 
of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post 
of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals’ demand for insurance coverage. In turn, 
this affects equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection.  
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Governments often help in protecting their citizenry against risks.  This may take many 
forms.  For example, governments might offer public insurance; they might reinsure 
particularly problematic catastrophic risks; or they might provide for low-interest loans 
following a severe loss.  Oftentimes, this relief takes the form of guaranteeing some 
minimum level of wealth.  Poorer families suffering a loss might receive direct transfer 
payments to bring them up to some predetermined minimum wealth level.  Or consider 
bankruptcy laws that allow for one to shield some pre-specified level of wealth against 
creditors. 
 
  In this paper, we consider only the case in which government assistance takes the 
form of guaranteeing some minimum wealth level, such as via direct government 
transfers following a loss.  Our focus is not on the merits of having this type of assistance 
program in place; rather we examine its effects within an insurance market subject to 
adverse selection.  In particular, we already know that adverse selection itself imposes 
some welfare costs, since any type of efficiency that is obtained must be “second-best” in 
nature.  In this paper, we examine how such second-best insurance contracting is affected 
by the existence of the government assistance.  We pay particular attention to how the 
welfare costs (often referred to as “signaling costs”) associated with the adverse selection 
are affected.   
 
Except for non-economic reasons, such as personal pride, government assistance 
can act as a substitute for market-based insurance: the possibility of government 
assistance might lower the demand for insurance.  Or perhaps not.  Consider the simple 
case of a two-state loss vs. no-loss model.  Since government subsidy programs are 
typically written to be “excess” of insurance coverage, government benefits are 
calculated only after all insurance indemnities have been paid out.  For instance, 
purchasing a level of insurance that would leave one at a wealth level equal to the 
  1government-guaranteed minimum in the loss state would be totally redundant.  One could 
receive the same wealth level in the loss state via government assistance, without the 
purchase of insurance.  Indeed, one would be better off with government assistance, since 
there would not be any insurance premium to pay in the no-loss state of the world.  The 
government essentially provides “free insurance.” 
  
  On the other hand, if insurance prices were actuarially fair, one would want to 
purchase full coverage insurance in the absence of any governmental assistance 
programs.  Of course, this “fair premium” is based upon the full amount of the loss.  By 
paying the premium for full coverage, an individual must give up the value of the 
government assistance.  This creates a type of fixed cost for purchasing full insurance.  
Put differently, the individual would need to weigh the relative benefit of receiving the 
minimal governmental level of “insurance” for a zero premium, versus paying a market-
based insurance premium in return for a full-coverage insurance contract.   
 
  Now suppose that, for some reason, insurance coverage available via the 
marketplace were limited.  In this case, the tradeoff between government assistance and 
market insurance would be different.  For example, in the extreme, if the level of 
insurance available in the marketplace left the individual with no more wealth in the loss 
state than he or she would have via government assistance, there would be a zero demand 
for market insurance.  More generally, since the marginal price of insurance is still fair, 
the individual either (i) will buy as much insurance as is available; or (ii) will not 
purchase any insurance at all.  
 
This point was made theoretically by Shavell (1986), in a liability context.  The 
main focus of Shavell’s paper is to consider the effects of limited liability on the optimal 
level of care taken by a potential injurer.  A later paper by Kaplow (1991), considers the 
effects of government relief on optimal care and optimal risk allocation.  In this paper, we 
assume that there are no moral hazard issues and that loss probabilities are fixed.  Instead, 
we examine the effects of government relief or bankruptcy shields on equilibria in a 
market characterized by adverse selection. 
 
  If we consider a competitive insurance market in the presence of adverse 
selection, the value of such governmental assistance is likely to differ among the various 
risk types in the population.  This is due to two reasons in particular.  First, it may be the 
case that each risk type would self-select a different level of market-insurance coverage 
  2in an equilibrium.  Thus, each type must compare its own unique “market contract” with 
the option of forgoing insurance and accepting government assistance.  Second, the 
different loss probabilities affect the relative valuation of the market insurance contracts 
offered vis-à vis the alternative of government assistance.   
 
  In this paper, we examine how government involvement in providing subsistence-
level wealth affects equilibria in adverse-selection economies.  We show the effects upon 
both the nature and the existence of equilibrium in three particular cases: the classic 
Nash-equilibrium model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the potential pooling 
equilibrium of Wilson (1977), and the cross-subsidization equilibrium of Miyazaki 
(1977) and Spence (1978).  
 
  We start in the next section with a simple model of insurance demand in a world 
with competitive insurance markets and government assistance programs of the type 
mentioned above.  We next examine the effects of such programs in the various models 




Government Assistance under Complete Information 
 
In this section we set up a simple model of government-guaranteed subsistence levels and 
their affect upon insurance demand.  Our model is essentially an adaptation of Shavell 
(1986).  
 
  Consider a risk-averse expected-utility-maximizing individual with an initial 
wealth level W.  The individual is exposed to a loss of a fixed size l≤ W, which occurs 
with probability p, 0<p<1.  To simplify the exposition, we assume that the loss is total, if 
it occurs, i.e. l=W.  We assume that p is fixed, so that there are no moral hazard issues.  
An insurance contract is specified as an ordered pair (α, β ), where α  denotes the premium 
to be paid in the no-loss state in return for a net benefit of β  in the loss state.  We assume 
that insurance markets are competitive with the premium for any insurance contract set at 
an actuarially fair price.  If we let I denote the gross indemnity, then β =I-α .  In other 
words,  β  is simply the indemnity benefit net of the premium paid.  Actuarially fair 
pricing implies that the premium equals the expected gross indemnity: α =pI, or 
equivalently  /(1 ) p p α β =− .   If the individual is allowed to choose any level of benefit 
  3β , under the fair-pricing assumption, it is well known since Mossin (1968) that the 
individual will choose full coverage:  , (1 ) pWp α W β == − . 
 
  Now suppose that the government establishes a minimum level of consumption, 
say R1>0.  If wealth falls below R1, the government will provide transfer payments to the 
individual to make up the difference.  This is illustrated via a standard state-claims 
diagram in Figure 1.  The individual’s initial state claim is at (W, 0).  However, since the 
individual’s state-2 wealth of zero falls below the guaranteed minimum of R1, the 
government will provide the individual with a transfer payment of R1 to make up the 
difference.  Thus, the individual’s de facto initial state claim is (W, R1), which is depicted 
as point X in the diagram.  For example, suppose the individual has an initial wealth of 
$50,000 and might lose it all with a probability of p=0.2.  Say the government will ensure 
a wealth level of $10,000.  Thus, if a total loss occurs, the government provides a transfer 
payment of $10,000. 
 
  Consider the purchase of insurance under these conditions.  We assume that the 
government assistance is only provided after all insurance indemnification has been paid 
out.  Suppose insurance prices are actuarially fair.  The individual can have essentially 
$10,000 worth of “insurance coverage” with a zero premium, via the government.  But if 
the individual desires a wealth level of, say, $10,001 in the loss state, she cannot simply 
buy the extra $1 in net coverage.  She must purchase the amount $12,501.25 worth of 
insurance at the fair price, which amounts to an insurance premium of $2500.25, for a net 
wealth of β =$10,001 if the loss state.  Thus, the extra net $1 benefit is very expensive.  
Obviously, in this circumstance, the individual would rather have the free government 
assistance.  In essence, we can view the opportunity cost of the government assistance as 
a type of “fixed cost” for obtaining marginal insurance coverage. But since marginal 
pricing of insurance is fair, if the individual decides to purchase insurance, she will opt 
for full coverage.
1   
 
  In Figure 1, this can be seen by noting that the line WYZ denotes the fair-price 
line for insurance.  However, purchases for insurance with β <R1 will be state dominated 
by the government assistance.  Indeed, the true decision of the individual will be to 
choose the best state-claim along the piecewise-linear, kinked line XYZ.  Given risk 
aversion and fair pricing, this leads to a simple comparison of wealth with full coverage  
                                                 
1  This follows easily from Mossin (1968).  

















Figure 1:  Government Relief and Effective Insurance Prices 
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(at C*) or wealth with zero coverage (at X).  As drawn in Figure 1, we see that full 
coverage will yield a higher level of expected utility than zero coverage. 
 
  Of course, the choice of full coverage vs. zero coverage will depend upon the 
individual circumstances.  For example, in Figure 2, we consider two higher levels of 
government-guaranteed wealth R3 > R2 > R1.  As drawn in Figure 2, we see that at 
government-guaranteed wealth level R3 the individual prefers no insurance to full 
insurance (state-claim X3 is preferred to C*).  Similarly, we see that at government-
guaranteed wealth level R2 the individual is indifferent between full coverage and no 
coverage.  Indeed, it is obvious that we obtain a type of “bang-bang” solution whereby 
there exists a unique cutoff level of government-guaranteed wealth, R*, such that zero 
insurance is optimal if and only if the guaranteed wealth R is more than R*.
2  Of course, 
R* is unique to the individual and need not be the same for everyone.  For example, it is 
easy to show that, ceteris paribus, a higher degree of absolute risk aversion leads to a 
higher cutoff level of R*.  
 
 
Adverse Selection and Separating Equilibria 
 
Here, we consider the adverse-selection model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  There 
are two types of individuals within one risk classification, who differ only in their 
probabilities of a loss.  The “good risks” have a probability of loss pG that is lower than 
the corresponding loss probability of the “bad risks,” pB, 0<pG<pB<1.  Individuals have 
private information about their own type while insurers only know the distribution of the 
two types within the population, i.e. they know λ , the fraction of bad risks in the 
population. 
 
  Rothschild and Stiglitz consider a competitive insurance market in which 
consumers are offered a menu of contracts.  Insurers are risk neutral and seek to 
maximize expected profit.  Each insurance contract consists of an (α, β ) pair, denoting  
 
                                                 
2  This was essentially shown by Shavell (1986), who examines liability for damages that might exceed 
one’s wealth.  In Shavell’s model, initial wealth varies, whereas here, the level of government-guaranteed 
wealth (which could be a bankruptcy shield) varies while initial wealth stays fixed.  


















Figure 2:  Government Relief vs. Insurance 
  7the premium and the net indemnity.  Individuals are free to choose from among all of the 
contracts made available.  An equilibrium set of contracts is characterized as follows: 
 
E1.  Every contract type in the equilibrium set expects to earn a zero profit. 
 
E2.  There does not exist a contract that is not in the equilibrium set that would be 
able to earn a positive profit, on average, if added to the set of equilibrium 
contracts. 
 
In order to rule out contracts with zero demand, we also assume that each contract 
type in the equilibrium set is purchased by some consumers.  Condition E1 above is an 
assumption that firms in competitive markets earn zero profit in the long run.  Condition 
E2 is that the resulting equilibrium is a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.
3 
 
  If an equilibrium exists, Rothschild and Stiglitz show that it must be a separating 
equilibrium designed as follows.  The bad risks receive full insurance at a fair price for 
the bad risks:  , (1 ) BB p Wp α W β == −
( 1 ) / ) ] GG G G p α
.  The good risks receive a level of coverage at the 
good-risk fair price, but it is restricted by an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereby 
the bad risks must not prefer the good-risk contract to their own.  In particular, we allow 
only a restricted amount of coverage, α G, to be purchased at the lower good-risk price.  
The level α G is chosen such that the bad risks are indifferent between the contingent 
wealth pair with full insurance at the bad-risk price, [(1-pB)W; (1-pB)W], and the 
contingent wealth pair under restricted level of coverage at the good risk price 
.  These two contingent wealth levels are depicted as B and G 
in Figure 3.
[, Wp α −−
4   
 
  The separating equilibrium consists of two contracts, yielding contingent 
allocations G and B.  The good risks self-select G while the bad risks prefer B.  It is 
interesting to note the welfare implications of the adverse selection here.  In a market 
with complete information, the bad risks would have full insurance at allocation B, same  
                                                 
3  Of course, insurers might have costs to be met in the real world, but they also have investment 
opportunities from premium funds, which do not manifest themselves in our static model.  Thus, the zero-
profit assumption is not too unrealistic.  The equilibrium is Nash if we view contract offers as the strategy 
space for insurers.  E2 then requires that strategies be mutual best responses. 
4  Although the bad risks are indifferent to these two contracts, we assume they opt for full coverage.  In a 
more realistic discrete setting, we could assume that β G is reduced by one cent, so that there is a strict 
preference by the bad risks. 





























Figure 3:  Rothschild-Stiglitz Separating Equilibrium 
  9 
as they do with the adverse selection.  Thus, there is no loss or gain in welfare for the bad 
risks.  The good risks, however, would be able to buy full insurance at a good-risk fair 
price under complete information and achieve allocation H.  The good risks thus must 
bear a welfare loss by restricting their coverage to α G.  This is often considered a 
“signaling cost” that must be borne in order to obtain the favorable good-risk price.   
 
  Let us consider now how the existence of government-guaranteed minimum 
wealth affects this equilibrium setting.  At very low levels of government guarantees, the 
equilibrium will not be affected at all.  This is clearly the case with the government 
guarantee set at R1 in Figure 3.   
 
In the other extreme, if the government-guaranteed minimum wealth is high 
enough, such as at level R3 in the figure, both types of individuals will prefer zero 
coverage to market insurance.  In this setting, all individuals will have contingent wealth 
X3.  Note that, as drawn, the good risks still have a welfare loss due to signaling costs, 
since in the absence of adverse selection they would achieve contingent wealth H, which 
is strictly preferred to X3.   
 
Of course, we cannot fully compare welfare levels with and without government 
assistance.  This would require taking the source of government financing into account.  
To say that the signaling cost is lower under government subsistence level R3 is true; 
however the total welfare effect on the good risks would need to consider any taxes paid 
in order to finance government relief.  However, we can assume a world with government 
relief in place and then consider the welfare effects (signaling costs) of the adverse 
selection, compared to a world with no government assistance.
 5  Under full information, 
each type chooses either full coverage at its own fair price, or it chooses zero coverage 
and accepts government assistance.  Thus, under government relief level R3, adverse 
selection has a lower welfare loss (since the bad risks choose X3 with or without 
information asymmetry and the good-risk welfare loss at X3 is less than at G).  At the 
lower level of assistance R1, the welfare loss from information asymmetry is the same as 
in the world without government relief. 
                                                 
5  This comparison assumes that any income effects, due to higher taxes in the world with government 
relief, are negligible.  If we tell a story where government guarantees are via bankruptcy shields, 
established by law, then the minimum subsistence level costs would be financed by unpaid claims due to 
injured third parties, as is the case in Shavell (1986). 
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  Finally, since the good-risk indifference curve is always steeper than the bad-risk 
indifference curve through the same contingent wealth, there will be some levels of 
government guarantees for which the good risks prefer no insurance, while the bad risks 
still prefer full coverage.  This is true at government guarantee of income level R2 in 
Figure 3, for example.  Under R2, a separating equilibrium offers only one insurance 
contract, full insurance at the bad-risk price.  Only the bad risks will purchase this 
contract, whereas the good risks will purchase no coverage and opt for the government 
relief. 
 
  If we consider the world with government relief level R2 in place, the bad risks 
receive B with or without the adverse selection, whereas the good risks obtain wealth 
claim X2 rather than G, representing the welfare cost of adverse selection, which is lower 
than the loss without the government relief.   
 
 
Pooling Contracts and Equilibrium 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there cannot exist a pooling Nash equilibrium.  
However, Wilson (1977) extends the equilibrium class to one for which a pooling 
equilibrium is possible.  In Wilson’s “anticipatory” equilibrium, we replace the 
equilibrium E2 with the following: 
 
E2’.  There does not exist a contract that, if added to the set of equilibrium 
contracts, would be able to earn a positive expected profit, even after non-
profitable contracts are withdrawn from the market. 
 
  To see the impact of Wilson’s definition, let us first consider the possibility of a 
pooling contract in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model.  Such a contract offers an (α, β ) 
contract pair with prices set such that  /(1 ) p p λ α λ β =− , where  (1 ) BG p pp λ λλ =+ −  is 
the “fair pooling price” per dollar of indemnity.  If everyone purchases the pooling 
contract, then any contract satisfying this price relationship will break even, on average.  
The contract earns a profit on the good risks, and generates a loss on the bad risks, but 
breaks even on average.   
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Figure 4:  Pooling Contracts 
  12  The pooling price line is drawn in Figure 4.  It will lie somewhere between the 
good-risk and the bad-risk price lines, depending on the relative number of bad risks, λ .  
If λ  is high enough, so that the pooling price line lies close to the bad-risk price line, then 
the good risks will all prefer their separating contract (α G, β G), at wealth level G, to all 
possible pooling contracts.  However, if λ  is low enough, such as drawn in Figure 4, there 
will be some pooling contracts that are preferred by the good risks to (α G, β G).  For 
example, consider the insurance contract (α P, β P) that leaves everyone with contingent 
wealth P.  This contract would earn a zero profit on average if both types purchase it.  
Contingent wealth P is preferred by the good risks to G and by the bad risks to B.  Hence, 
everyone would indeed purchase the pooling contract (α P, β P) if it were added to the set 
of separating contracts.  Indeed, if we reduce β  by some small amount ε , then the contract 
(α P, β P-ε ) would also be preferred by everyone, and this contract would earn a positive 
profit on average, thus negating the equilibrium properties of the separating contracts.   
 
  Of course a positive profit could not persist in equilibrium, but why not an 
equilibrium pooling contract at (α P, β P)?  Since the good risk indifference curve through 
P must be steeper than the bad risk indifference curve, we can always find some new 
contract, such as (α K, β K) yielding wealth level K in Figure 4, satisfying the following 
properties: 
 
a)  The good risks prefer contract (α K, β K). 
b)  The bad risks prefer contract (α P, β P). 
c)  Contract (α K, β K) earns a profit, on average, if only the good risks buy it. 
 
It is clear that contract (α P, β P) cannot satisfy equilibrium condition E2, hence is not a 
Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium.  Indeed, the same arguments were used by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz to show that no pooling contract will be a Nash equilibrium.   
 
Using Wilson’s property E2’ in our definition of equilibrium changes matters 
however.  Under Wilson’s equilibrium, if λ  is high enough, the pair of Rothschild-Stiglitz 
separating contracts will remain the equilibrium.  However, in a situation where λ  is low 
enough, such as depicted in Figure 4, there will exist a pooling equilibrium.  Hence, there 
always exists an equilibrium in Wilson’s model.  In particular, the zero-profit pooling 
contract that is the most preferred by the good risks will be the equilibrium pooling 
contract.  This is precisely contract  (α P, β P) in Figure 4, yielding contingent-wealth P.  
The reason for this is clear.  Any profits will be driven out by long-run competition.  And, 
  13any other zero-profit pooling contract, if offered concurrent with (α P, β P) would attract 
no buyers among the good risks.  Thus, such a contract would lose money, on average, if 
only the bad risks purchase it.   
 
  The reason that (α P, β P) can support an equilibrium under Wilson’s definition is 
that a contract such as (α K, β K) will not be offered.  This is because the addition of 
contract (α K, β K) initially would attract only the good risks, leaving the bad risks as the 
only ones purchasing (α P, β P).  In this event, the contract (α P, β P) would lose money and 
hence be withdrawn from the market.  However, if this happens, then (α K, β K) would 
attract both good risks and bad risks, and would thus also lose money.  As a result, the 
contract (α P, β P) is a pooling equilibrium. 
 
  So how does the existence of a government-guaranteed minimum wealth affect 
potential pooling-equilibrium contracts?  Obviously, if the level of government relief is 
very low, such as at level R1 in Figure 5, then it will have no effect upon a pooling 
equilibrium.  Contingent claim P dominates X1 for both risk types in Figure 5.  Similarly, 
if the government-guaranteed wealth level is sufficient high, such as at level R4 in Figure 
5, both types of individuals will prefer to accept the government relief and purchase no 
insurance coverage.  In Figure 5, contingent claim P is dominated by X4 for both risk 
types. 
 
  The interesting cases occur when the level of government relief is high enough to 
attract just one of the two types of risks.  Since good-risk indifference curves are 
everywhere steeper, this can only occur by attracting the good risks.  Such is the case at 
the government-guaranteed wealth level R3 in Figure 5.  This would yield a contingent-
wealth claim of X3 with no insurance, versus P with the pooling contract (α P, β P).  In this 
setting, the bad risks would prefer (α P, β P), whereas the good risks are better off with no 
insurance.  In a Rothschild-Stiglitz type setting, this would preclude (α P, β P) from being 
an equilibrium, since only the bad risks purchase it and, hence, it loses money.  The same 
is true under Wilson’s definition of equilibrium.  In both settings, equilibrium would 
entail both types of individuals purchasing zero coverage, since X3 is preferred to full 
coverage by the bad risks. 
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Figure 5:  Pooling Equilibrium and Government Relief 
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  Another interesting possibility can occur in some circumstances, as is illustrated 
in Figure 5 at government-guaranteed wealth level R2.
6  First of all, let us recall that in 
the absence of any government relief, there would be no Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium 
in the setting for Figure 5.  If we use Wilson’s concept of equilibrium, then we would 
obtain the pooling equilibrium contract (α P, β P).  Now, at the level of minimum wealth 
R2, the good risks prefer no insurance at contingent wealth X2, while the bad risks prefer 
the pooling contract (α P, β P) at wealth P.  As a result, if the pooling contract is offered, it 
will lose money, since only bad risks will purchase it.  Thus (α P, β P) is not viable.  
However, note that the bad risks prefer full coverage at the bad-risk fair price to zero 
coverage.  As a result, we will obtain a separating equilibrium, in which the bad risks 
purchase full coverage at contingent-wealth B and the good risks purchase no coverage at 
contingent wealth level X2.  This is true for either the Wilson or the Rothschild-Stiglitz 
definition of equilibrium.  In other words, we go from either no equilibrium (in the 
Rothschild-Stiglitz sense) or a pooling equilibrium (in Wilson’s sense) to a separating 
equilibrium when the government guarantee is set at R2.  
 
  To consider the welfare effects due to the informational asymmetry, at relief level 
R1, we obtain a Wilson pooling equilibrium and the welfare effect is the same as without 
government intervention.  At R4 the welfare effect depends on whether or nor the good 
risks prefer X4 to full insurance at the good risk price.  If they do, there is no welfare loss.  
Otherwise, the loss is simply the difference in good-risk utility between X4 and full 
coverage.  At R3, the bad risks have X3 with or without the informational asymmetry, but 
the good risks also receive contingent-wealth X3, which might or might not be preferred 
to the full coverage.  At R2, the good risks do not purchase insurance, which again might 
or might not be preferred to the full insurance available in the full-information case.  The 
bad risks will have full coverage at B, same as in the full-information case. 
 
  If we compare these welfare losses to those in the no-government-relief world, 
obviously R4, leads to lower welfare loss, since everyone is better off at X4 than at P.  But 
at R2 and R3 we have a tradeoff.  In both cases the good risks are better off than at P, 
                                                 
6  Situations such as R1, R3 and R4 always exist.  A situation as depicted at R2 might or might not exist 
depending upon where the good-risk indifference curve through P and the bad-risk indifference curve 
through B intersect.  If his occurs at a higher no-loss wealth level than W, then a situation such as that at X2 
will not be possible. 
  16whereas the bad risks prefer P to either X3 (in the case where the government-guaranteed 
minimum wealth is R3) or to B (in the case where the government-guaranteed minimum 
wealth is R2).  Thus any general claim about higher or lower welfare costs due to the 
informational asymmetry depend upon the welfare criterion used. 
 
 
Subsidizing Contracts and Equilibrium 
 
The Rothschild-Stiglitz definition of equilibrium included the long-run-competition 
condition E1, that every type of contract offered earns an expected profit of zero.   
However, an alternative assumption is the following: 
 
  E1’:  Every insurer’s set of equilibrium contracts earns a zero profit, on average. 
 
Condition E1’ allows for some types of contracts to earn a positive profit, so long as 
other contracts offered expect to generate a loss.  The key competitive assumption is that 
the menu of all contracts must break even, as opposed to assuming that every contract 
breaks even. 
 
Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) use this assumption, along with Wilson’s 
anticipatory-equilibrium condition E2’ to examine a class of subsidizing equilibria.  To 
see how this works, consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz set of separating contracts: full 
insurance (α B, β B) for the bad risks with partial insurance (α G, β G) for the good risks.  
This provides the bad risks and the good risks with contingent wealth levels B and G 
respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3 and again in Figure 6. 
 
  Now suppose that we allow the bad risks to receive full insurance at a premium 
priced with a subsidy of σ  > 0.  In other words, the bad risks receive the full-coverage 
contract (α B -σ , β B+σ ).  This is illustrated as yielding the contingent wealth B1 in Figure 
6.  In order to finance this subsidy, the good risks are offered insurance with a fair 
marginal price, but with a “tax” of τ  per policy.  The break-even condition E1’ implies 
that we must have  .  The good-risk contract thus must include this tax by 
adding τ  to the premium in the no-loss state of nature and subtracting τ  from the net 
indemnity in the loss state.   
/(1 ) τλσ λ =−
 
 


























Figure 6:  Subsidizing Contracts 
  18The level of insurance coverage offered to the good risks is once again limited by the 
incentive-compatibility constraint of the bad risks.  The good risks are offered as much 
coverage as possible, without providing an incentive for the bad risks to self-select the 
good-risk contract.  This is illustrated as the contract leading to contingent-wealth G1 in 
Figure 6.  Thus the pair of insurance contracts leading to the contingent-wealth levels B1 
and G1 in Figure 6 satisfies the zero-profit condition E1’and it is possibly preferred by 
both the good risks and the bad risks to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating pair of 
contracts: the bad risks definitely prefer B1 to B and the good risks might prefer G1 to G.  
Might this subsidizing set of contracts be an equilibrium in the sense of Wilson?   
 
  Of course we can always adjust the subsidy and tax to find more such subsidizing 
pairs.  The set of all good-risk wealth allocations derived from these subsidizing contracts 
is illustrated as the curve GGMPM in Figure 7.  For each contingent-wealth allocation for 
the good risks along this locus, the corresponding bad-risk wealth allocation is 
determined by the bad-risk indifference curve through this allocation: the bad risks 
receive full insurance yielding this level of expected utility.  For example, at allocation 
GM for the good risks, the bad risks would receive full insurance at contingent-wealth 
allocation BM.  As another example, the wealth allocation at PM is for full insurance at a 
pooling price.  Such an insurance contract, when purchased by both types, is also a zero-
profit subsidizing “pair” of contracts. 
 
  As drawn in Figure 7, GM yields the most preferred level of contingent-wealth 
available to the good risks from among all subsidizing contracts.  Let (,)
MM
GG α β  denote 
the contract pair associated with wealth GM.  Likewise, let (α , )
MM
BB β  denote the 
corresponding full insurance contract associated with contingent-wealth BM.   
 
If another subsidizing pair of contracts [( , );( , )]
ss ss
GG BB α β α β  was offered it could 
not be the equilibrium.  The reasoning is as follows.  Since (α , )
MM
BB β  is the most 
preferred contract for the good risks, any other contingent-wealth along the curve 
GGMPM in Figure 7 yields less utility for the good risks.  Thus, a new contract could be 
offered with net benefit 
M
G β  for the good risks, but with a premium slightly higher than 
M




G β + , would be preferred to ( , )
s s
G G α β  by the good risks.  




B β  for the bad risks.  
Thus, the contract pair [  would earn a slight profit if both types   ( , );(
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Figure 7:  Miyazaki-Spence Equilibrium 
  20of contracts were purchased.  Whether the bad risks are better off with ( , )
s s
BB α β  or with 
(,
MM
BB α ) β  is irrelevant here, since the contract pair [( , );( ,
ss s
GG B α )]
s
B β α β  would lose 
money for an insurer if no good risks purchase ( , )
s s
GG α β .  Hence, under condition E2’ for 
a Wilson-type of equilibrium, the contract ( , )
s s
BB α β  would be withdrawn from the 









  The addition of government relief to the model has the same consequences as in 
the case of a Wilson pooling equilibrium.  If the level of government-guaranteed 
minimum wealth is very low, such as R1 in Figure 7, then it has no effect on the private 
market equilibrium.  If the level of government-guaranteed minimum wealth is very high, 
such as R4, then both types will not purchase any insurance.   
 
Now suppose that the level of government-guaranteed minimum wealth is at a 
level that makes the no-insurance option preferred by the good-risk type only.  Since 
under a Wilson equilibrium the bad risk contract ( , )
MM
BB α β  would be withdrawn from the 
market, the bad risks will have to receive some other alternative.  In this case we have 
two possible outcomes.  If the guarantee level is low enough, such as at R2, the bad risks 
will be offered full insurance at the bad-risk fair price.  In this case the Miyazki-Spence 
equilibrium will yield contingent-wealth X2 for the good risks and B for the bad risks.  
However, if the guarantee level is a bit higher, say at R3, the bad risks will prefer no 
insurance to full coverage.  This implies a Miyazaki-Spence equilibrium in which no one 
buys market insurance and everyone has the same contingent-wealth claim X3.   
 
  The welfare effects in the case of a Miyazaki-Spence are very similar to those in 
the case of a Wilson pooling equilibrium and not discussed in detail here.  Once again, at 
R2, R3 and R4, we do not know without more information whether or not the good risks 
are better off with no insurance or with full insurance.  Hence, the good risk welfare 
might or might not be lower under adverse selection than under complete information.  
                                                 
7  Actually, there is no guarantee that the curve GGMPM will be concave.  If it is not, we might find that the 
highest level of expected utility for the good risks is achievable via more than one good risk contract.  In 
such a case, the Miyazaki-Spence equilibrium contract is the one with the highest level of coverage, and 
hence highest tax, for the good risks.  If this were not the case, some good risks might buy one of contracts 
with a lower subsidy.  The bad risks, on the other hand, all will be best off buying the full-coverage 
contract with the highest subsidy.  But this contract will lose money if a fraction less than 1-λ  of the good 
risks pay the highest tax. 
  21And once again the bad risks are worse off at either X3 or B than they are in the 





We examined several models of insurance markets under adverse selection.  Our point of 
departure is that we allow government subsidies to be considered as an alternative to 
market insurance.  In all models considered, a very low level of relief did not affect 
insurance markets at all, whereas a very high level of relief made all individuals prefer 
government assistance to market insurance.  In a Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) setting, 
government relief might alter the set of separating-equilibrium contracts.  In particular, 
we might find that the bad risks purchase full coverage while the good risks decide not to 
buy any insurance.  This latter type of separation also might lead to an equilibrium in 
circumstances for which a Rothschild-Stiglitz type of equilibrium (i.e. Nash equilibrium) 
does not exist in the absence of government intervention. 
 
  In the case of Wilson’s (1977) anticipatory equilibrium, we may find the same 
results as above.  On the other hand, we might have a market with a Wilson pooling 
equilibrium, in which the equilibrium changes from a pooling to a separating-type of 
equilibrium after government assistance is offered in the economy.  Similarly, 
government assistance can alter the type of separation that would occur in a model in a 
model similar to that of Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978).  
 
  In all of our analyses, we did not consider the source of financing for government 
assistance.  In a large economy, with many public-goods projects, we can approximate 
this effect on the insureds as a deadweight loss on each individual.  Of course, unless we 
use some severely strong criterion, such as the Pareto criterion, we need to balance off 
gains and losses in welfare to see the total value of such government assistance to society.  
However, any reduction in signaling costs should be a part of any such evaluation.   
Similarly, these signaling costs need to be included if we wish to compare alternative 
government assistance programs.   
 
  We also assumed that the level of wealth to be guaranteed as the government-
guaranteed subsistence level was public knowledge.  More realistically, individuals will 
only have some estimate of the level of government assistance that might be available or 
  22even whether such relief is forthcoming at all.  In our model, this type of uncertainty 
would render the level of the guaranteed-minimum wealth R   to be random, which in turn 
would be less valuable to risk-averse individuals.  The effect of this type of randomness 
obviously will have an effect on the purchase of insurance, but this complicates the 
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